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The Place of the Psyche in a Constructed World
Kenneth J. Gergen
Interest in the family of ideas loosely labeled "social constructionist" has burgeoned
within recent years, and now spans the full range of the social sciences and
humanities. Constructionist scholarship has been devoted to understanding the
generation, transformation, and suppression of what we take to be objective
knowledge; exploring the literary and rhetorical devices by which meaning is
achieved and rendered compelling; illuminating the ideological and valuational
freighting of the unremarkable or taken for granted; documenting the implications of
world construction for the distribution of power; gaining an appreciation of the
processes of relationship from which senses of the real and the good are achieved;
comprehending the historical roots and vicissitudes of various forms of
understanding; and exploring the range and variability in human intelligibility across
cultures. It is to charting the course of this work that I devoted much of my book,
Realities and Relationships (Gergen, 1994). Yet, while provoking lively interest
across the academic sphere, psychologists themselves have been relatively resistant
to joining the constructionist dialogues. Social constructionism is virtually absent
from the common discussions of mental functioning and dysfunction within the field.
There are many reasons for the general insularity of psychological science from this
intellectual watershed. Certainly among the most important is what many take to be a
fundamental antagonism between the psychological and constructionist projects.
Within traditional psychology, mental processes are not only the chief subject of
inquiry, but serve as the critical fulcrum for explaining human action. For social
constructionism, in contrast, the chief locus of understanding is not in "the psyche"
but in social relationships. All that psychology traces to mental origins,
constructionists might wish to explain through micro social process. If the
psychological project were fully vindicated, there would be no explanatory
remainder, a world of human action for which social constructionism would be a
necessary adjunct. The reverse seems equally as plausible: the vindication of
constructionism would portend the end of psychology.
However, this dolorous conclusion is not wholly inevitable. It is favored primarily by
a realist metaphysics and a correspondence view of language, both of which sustain a
view of science in which there is a single, knowable reality, and in which theories
compete for explanatory and predictive superiority. It is this view of science that,
historically, has fostered a recurring pattern of internecine antagonism, in which
behaviorism functioned to eradicate mentalism, and cognitivism has since served to
silence behaviorist voices. However, constructionist scholars are not typically drawn
either to a realist metaphysics or a correspondence theory of language. For the
constructionist there is no justification for foundational enunciations of the real;
whatever we take to be essential is an outcome of social interchange. Theories cannot

be falsified by virtue of their correspondence with something else called "the real,"
but only within the conventions of particular enclaves of meaning. Thus
constructionists establish no transcendent grounds for eliminating any theoretical
formulation. Thus, to eradicate a theoretical perspective would not only be
tantamount to losing a mode of human intelligibility (along with related social
practices), but to silence a community of meaning making. Within a constructionist
metaphysics it would be virtually impossible to locate grounds for such suppression,
and indeed many would argue that there is implicit in constructionism a strong
pluralist ethic (see, for example, Sampson, 1993).
Given a constructionist metatheory, how are we then to view professional
investments in psychological research, as well as mental health practices, public
policy advisories, and other practices based on ontologies of mental process? If not
eradication, what role is the ontology of the mind to play in a constructionist
orientation to human action? Or conversely, what place is there in psychology for
social constructionism? It is here that the constructionist concern with the pragmatics
of language usage becomes paramount. For the constructionist language serves
neither as a picture or a map of what is the case; rather (following Wittgenstein,
1953), it acquires its meaning from its use within human interchange (which usages
may also include a "game of reality positing.") From this standpoint, any analysis of
scientific or scholarly accounts of the world would primarily (though not exclusively)
be concerned with the uses to which such languages are put. Within what kinds of
relationships do they play an important role, and what are the repercussions of
particular forms of language use for those who directly or indirectly participate in
these relationships? There can be no canonical slate of criteria for evaluating such
appraisals, as various communities will share different concerns, which may
themselves change with time and circumstance. And too, the way such questions are
addressed and answered must itself be viewed as a byproduct of a community,
neither lodged within nor answered with respect to "the real," but reflecting
community investments and conventions of the time. This is scarcely to discredit
such inquiry; one can scarcely do more than raise questions of the real and the good
within particular traditions. Rather, it is to open scholarly and scientific discourse to
the full range of relevant communities (see also Feyerabend, 1978), without granting
any community an ultimate "grounds of assessment" by virtue of which other voices
may be silenced.
Within this context I wish to consider three major orientations to psychological
inquiry as informed by constructionist metatheory. These orientations may be
distinguished in terms of their evaluative posture. The specific attempt will be first to
delineate the logics of these prevailing and emerging orientations, and then to inquire
into their potentials. We have, then, a two-tiered analysis, first treating psychological
inquiry from contrasting constructionist standpoints, and then reflecting on the
standpoints themselves. The first of these orientations, which emphasizes
denaturalization, reflection and democratization, is at once the most fully developed
within the constructionist arena and the most fully critical of existing psychological
scholarship. At the same time its positive potentials for psychology have not been

sufficiently addressed. The second orientation, revitalization and enrichment, is far
more positive in its orientation to psychological inquiry. Although it is the least
developed, its elaboration seems critical to the future of the discipline. Finally, I wish
to explore constructionist efforts to remove certain problematic features from the
compendium of mental predicates, and to reconstruct the discourse in more
promising ways. This social reconstructive effort has dramatically accelerated in
recent years, but its internal tensions and broader ramifications have not heretofore
been addressed. Through this analysis, we may emerge with a more variegated
understanding of the relationship between psychological and constructionist
endeavors, an appreciation of affinities and interdependencies of traditional and
constructionist approaches to psychology, and an enhanced sense of humility
regarding all adventures in making meaning.
Denaturalization, Reflection and Democratization
There are reasons other than hegemonic threat for the failure of most psychologists to
join the broader dialogues on the social constitution of knowledge. Among them is
surely the critical posture of much constructionist scholarship to date - an impulse
that seems aimed at dismantling the authority of psychological science. Further,
because of the restricted forms of argumentation within the empirical wing of
psychology, with rare exception (cf. Held, 1995), its denizens have been at a loss to
answer these assaults. Neither insights into methodology and statistics, nor recourse
to "established fact" - favored moves within traditional empiricist argumentation count as legitimate rejoinders to forms of constructionist critique. Yet, critical
constructionism is not "all of a piece;" differing arguments are at stake. In order to
appreciate the force of these critical efforts, along with their potentials and
shortcomings, it is important to distinguish among them. Although convergent, they
rest on three distinct lines of reasoning: ideological unmasking, rhetorical
deconstruction, and social analysis.
In the case of ideological unmasking, constructionist critics point to the societal
ramifications of psychology's modes of describing and explaining human action. As
professional accounts are disseminated within the culture, bearing the stamp of
scientific authority, so do they inform people's actions and instruct social policy. In
Foucault's (1980) terms, there is a close relationship between claims to knowledge
and cultural power. Given the capacity of the profession to generate multiple and
diverse accounts of the person, choices in description and explanation are thus
matters of moral and political consequence. Within this context professional
psychology becomes a prime target of critique, criticism exacerbated further by the
profession's seemingly disingenuous claims to value neutrality. Thus, constructionist
scholars have variously set out to demonstrate the ways in which existing
psychological accounts (and the practices which they sustain), lend themselves to
broadening governmental control (Rose, 1990), destroying democratic foundations
(1984), promoting narcissism (Wallach and Wallach, 1983), championing
individualist ideology (Sampson,1977; Fowers and Richardson, 1996), eroding
community (Bellah et al, 1985; Sampson, 1977), fostering racism (Jones, 1991),

sustaining the patriarchal order (Hare-Mustin and Marecek,1988; M. Gergen, 1988;
Morawski,1994), contributing to western colonialism (Gergen, Gulerce, Lock, and
Misra, 1996), and more.
This form of critique contrasts sharply with literary and rhetorical deconstruction.
Representing a convergence of developments within Continental semiotics, poststructural literary theory, and rhetorical studies, it is reasoned in this case that all
sensible propositions about persons are lodged within broader systems of meaning. In
large measure, the intelligibility of any proposition is derived from its placement
within this system as opposed to its referential relationship to non-linguistic
occurrences (e.g. My ability to construct intelligible sentences about the nature of
"love" depends primarily on a textual history as opposed to observations of "the
phenomenon itself.") Rhetoricians add importantly to this concern with the textually
driven character of psychological discourse by demonstrating the manner in which
such discourse is constrained or fashioned by its function in social interchange. Here
it is argued that descriptions and explanations of mental life are importantly
dependent on the demands placed on the rhetor to achieve intelligibility ("to
persuade") a particular audience (e.g. The language required to render "love"
intelligible to a child, as opposed to a romantic partner, a priest, or a New Guinea
tribesman would be radically different). In this case, intelligibility is often traced to
various rhetorical tropes, such as narrative or metaphor. For example, regardless of
"the data," in giving an account of human development the investigator cannot escape
the demands of "proper story telling."
In this context of argument, the problem of professional psychology does not lie in its
discursive commitments per se, but in its claims to objective grounding for such
commitments. Truth claims, it is reasoned, operate to silence competing voices; the
discourse of objectivity and political totalitarianism are allied. The constructionist
critic thus functions to unmask the literary and rhetorical strategies responsible for
the sensibility (objectivity, intelligibility, felicity) of propositions about the mental
world. An early example of such unmasking is provided by Smedslund's (1978)
attempted to demonstrate that most experimental hypotheses in psychology are nonfalsifiable inasmuch as falsifications are linguistically incoherent. Similarly, I have
argued that all propositions relating mental predicates to an external world (either
stimulus or response) are circular; their intelligibility rests on implicit tautologies
(Gergen, 1987, see also Wallach and Wallach, 1994). More broadly, scholars have
variously argued that theories of the mind grow not from observation (inductively)
but are derived from prevailing metaphors (see, for example, Gigerenzer, 1996;
Soyland, 1994) and on cultural conventions of narrative or story telling (Sarbin,
1986; Gergen and Gergen, 1986). They have variously explored how "the facts"
cognitive dysfunction ("irrationality") are created through rhetorical tropes (Lopes,
1991), how the APA Publication Manual sustains implicit assumptions about human
action (Bazerman, 1988), and such manuals circumscribe forms of communication
and relationships - both within the profession and between the profession and the
culture at large (Budge and Katz, 1995).

A third logic of constructionist critique, the social-analytic, is stimulated by
significant developments within the sociology of knowledge and the history of
science. Here scholars have been particularly concerned with the ways in which
social processes shape the profession's assumptions about its subject matter, its
methodologies, and ultimately its conclusions regarding the nature of the world (see,
for example, Kuhn,1962; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). For psychology, the significant
argument is that it is through social negotiation that investigators determine the
grounding assumptions within which research will occur. Once the grounding
assumptions (paradigms) have gained consensus, then all interpretations of evidence
will necessarily serve as support; paradigms are not thus "tested" against fact; they
determine what will be counted as fact. Informed by these developments, the critical
analyst shares the previously voiced concerns with the unwarranted and totalitarian
claims of scientific psychology to accurate and objective readings of the mind.
Unmasking the social processes intrinsic to the production of "scientific truth" serves
the additional function of challenging longstanding boundaries within the discipline.
Because of traditional commitments to truth through method, there are strong
tendencies for the sub-disciplines to become insulated and self-serving, thus
absenting themselves from broader dialogic engagement - both within the academy
and the society more generally. Social critique thus serves as a catalyst for broader
interchange.
The social critique in psychology gained early sustenance from both
ethnomethodological explorations of the social negotiation of factuality - for
example, of suicide (Garfinkel, 1967) and gender (Kessler and McKenna, 1978) - and
labeling theories of deviance (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). Investigators have since
gone on to explore the social construction of a large array of "mental processes,"
including cognitive processes (Coulter, 1979), anger (Averill, 1982), emotion (Harre,
1986), schizophrenia (Sarbin and Mancuso, 1980), child development (Bradley,
1989), sexuality (Tiefer, 1992), anorexia and bulimia (Gordon, 1990), and depression
(Wiener and Marcus, 1994). This line of critique has also been augmented by broadranging scholarship attempting to locate the historical and cultural contexts within
which assumptions about psychological processes emerge. In the case of historical
work, scholars have variously been concerned with the social contexts giving rise, for
example, to people's constructions of foul and fragrant smells (Corbin, 1986), mental
development (Kirschner, 1996), multiple personality disorder (Hacking, 1995),
boredom (Spacks, 1995), and the subject in psychological research (Danziger,
1995).1 Cultural anthropologists have explored the cultural embeddedness of various
conceptions of the mind (see, for example, Heelas and Lock, 1981; Lutz, 1988;
Bruner, 1990). In effect, by tracing taken for granted beliefs about the mind to local
circumstances, the linked presumptions in the science of a "universal subject matter,"
singular methodology, and universal generalization are all placed in jeopardy.
At the outset, these three lines of critical scholarship (often working in tandem) pose
a formidable threat to traditional empirical psychology. With the empirical grounding
for professional truth claims undermined, so is the rationale for traditional research,
along with the profession's claims to authority within the culture more generally.

Further, the critics themselves have often contributed to the sense of an impending
elimination of psychological inquiry. The titles of works edited by Parker and his
colleagues, for example, Deconstructing social psychology (Parker and Shotter,
1990), and Deconstructing psychopathology (Parker, et al., 1995) are apposite.
However, such a funereal conclusion is without warrant. As earlier proposed, there is
nothing within constructionist premises that necessarily argue for the elimination of
any form of discourse. While constructionist critiques may often appear nihilistic,
there is no means by which they themselves can be grounded or legitimated. They too
fall victim to their own modes of critique; their accounts are inevitably freighted with
ethical and ideological implications, forged within the conventions of writing,
designed for rhetorical advantage, and their "objects of criticism" constructed within
and for a particular community. The objects of their criticism are no less constructed
than the traditional objects of research, nor do their moral claims rest on
transcendental foundations.
There is more: Even by constructionist standards, a rationale for empirical research
can be generated. One of the central arguments within constructionist metatheory is
that language is not mimetic: That is, it fails to function as a picture or map of an
independent world. Rather, it is reasoned, language operates performatively and
constitutively; it is employed by communities of interlocutors for purposes of
carrying out their relationships - including the local constitution of the real and the
good. As I have argued elsewhere (Gergen, 1994), such a view does not obliterate
empirical science; it simply removes its privilege of claiming truth beyond
community. There is nothing in constructionist arguments, for example, that would
call for an end to medical research. The constructionist would simply point out that
its ontological categories along with the identification of "sickness" and "cure" must
not be viewed as transcendentally accurate, but as byproducts of historically and
culturally located, ideologically invested conversation, serving particular social
functions. In the same way, psychologists may properly employ conceptions of
mental process in empirical research, and indeed such research may be used to
supplement processes of prediction within other sectors of the culture (for example,
prediction of voting patterns, juror's preferences, or the rate of suicide). The
constructionist claim is chiefly that there is no foundation for the addendum "is true"
to the language used in these endeavors. Secondarily constructionism invites
discussion of the political/ethical messages carried by the methods of research
themselves (see, for example, Morawski, 1988).
As we find, the critical voice of the constructionist should not be viewed as
liquidating. Rather, these lines of critical scholarship serve the useful functions of
denaturalization and democratization. In their denaturalizing the "objects of
research," along with methodologies, research reports, statistics, and resulting
practices, critical inquiry first invites an appropriate humility. They function to curb
the presumptuous claims to unbridled generality, truth beyond culture and history,
and fact without interpretation, which have generated broad skepticism within the
culture more generally, and yielded scorn more globally from those failing to share
the premises. Simultaneously, such critiques function as a continuous invitation to the

psychologist to avoid the blinders of the singular explanation, and to expand the
range of interpretive possibilities available to the profession and the culture. All that
seems "clearly the case," could be otherwise. We shall return to this issue shortly.
In addition to the advantages of denaturalization, these forms of critique also favor a
pluralist politics, both within the profession and with respect to the profession's
relationship to its many publics. They operate to "level the playing field" within the
profession, for example offering humanists, phenomenologists, feminists, and the
spiritual, the same right to reason and results as behaviorists and cognitivists. They
also open the profession to multiple voices from the culture more generally. Where
psychology had largely been deaf to ethical and ideological misgivings concerning its
conceptions, methods, and societal effects, critical scholarship welcomes such
inquiry into the professional forum. This pluralization of voices is especially
important, inasmuch as the assumptions of empirical psychology offer no means of
self-examination save through their own premises. Finally, efforts to denaturalize and
democratize invite a dialogic relationship between the profession and its many
publics, forms of interchange that should not only serve to render professional work
more intelligible, but enhance the applicability of professional work for the public
good. In effect, when its threatening rhetoric is removed, we find constructionist
critique serves to strengthen psychological inquiry in significant degree.
Revitalization and Enrichment
As I have argued, there is nothing within a constructionist metatheory that necessarily
militates against empirical work in psychology. By the same token, constructionism
itself does not prohibit the entry of any term into the lexicon of mental life. In this
sense, critics of constructionism who complain of its tendencies to denigrate or
obliterate the self (Osbeck, 1993; Harre and Krausz, 1996), or agency and uniqueness
(Fisher, 1995), or to privilege the social over the material (Michael, 1996), mistake
the metatheoretical orientation for a foundational ontology. Constructionist
metatheory neither denies nor affirms the existence of any such "entities" or
"processes." The question is not the existence of the putative referents of various
explanatory or descriptive terms; constructionism simply obviates issues of
fundamental ontology in favor of questions about interpretive functioning within
communities. In the same way, psychology's traditional discourses of cognition,
emotion, motivation, and mental disorder and the like, are not antagonistic to
constructionist metatheory. Rather, for the constructionist, these are simply
representative forms of constructing the person within an evolving professional
community, forms that bear a close and interdependent relationship with common
modes of discourse within contemporary culture (see for example, Cushman, 1995).
For the professional psychologist, mental discourses have a high degree of
communicative utility. Indeed, without shared discourses of this kind there would be
nothing to intelligibly call "a profession." However, given the legitimacy of a
tradition valued by its constituents in this way, constructionist metatheory does invite
a range of provocative deliberations. Among them, what forms of psychological

discourse are to be favored, and for what purposes? For whom are these languages
useful and for what kinds of projects? Do current investments primarily benefit the
constituents of the professional community; are they possibly injurious to the
recipients of such designations? To the extent that professional discourse is
appropriated by the culture, what kinds of policies, institutions, or individual actions
are favored? What forms of cultural life are rendered invisible or obliterated? And,
given the potential of such discourses to contribute to societal transformation, what
new or revived forms of discourse are invited?
It is in this domain of dialogue that we locate a second major orientation to
psychological inquiry favored by a constructionist standpoint. While deliberations on
the utility of current pursuits is essential, constructionism also frees the investigator
to suspend the taken for granted ontologies of the profession. The impetus toward
univocality ("unified psychology") is modulated. With the bounds of interpretation
thus expanded, the scholar is invited to explore the penumbra of emerging
intelligibility, forms of possible but unrealized articulation. I am not speaking here of
a myopic accumulation of "psychobabble," but rather, of the careful and caring
development of psychological discourse keyed to specific cultural (moral/political)
ends. If psychological language is used by persons for carrying on cultural life, then
new forms of language invite alternative futures. Alternative conceptions of mental
may favor forms of life more promising to many people than the currently obvious
and unquestioned. In this case the scholar abandons the problematic role of
describing "what is the case," and sets out to forge languages favoring what may
become. Detached observation gives way to what we may view as a poetic activism.
Yet, while constructionism removes the weight of existing ontologies, movement into
meaning can scarcely proceed outside the traditions of any community. A discourse
created outside the textual histories of any culture would not only fail to
communicate, there would be no practices to which it was relevant. No cultural work
would be achieved. It is in this respect that so much of the discourse generated within
isolated academic enclaves is elsewhere discredited as "mere jargon." In effect, the
construction of new meanings must draw from extant traditions without duplicating
them. It is useful here to consider the potentials for discursive enrichment as drawing
first on traditions within the home culture (historical archeology) and second, on
alterior traditions (cultural exegesis).
At the outset, the challenge of discursive enrichment places a premium on sustaining
the various traditions in psychology that have otherwise been suppressed by the
dominant discourses. For example, the humanist tradition has been largely ignored
within the major texts of the profession. Yet, while problematic in its dualism and its
individualism, the demise of the humanist language of intention serves as a threat to
cherished cultural institutions (e.g. democracy, ethics). Similarly, while
phenomenological theory was virtually obliterated with the early rise of behaviorism,
abandoning the language of subjective experience removes from the culture a
significant reason for valuing human life. The resuscitation of these languages in
terms of contemporary theoretical and cultural dialogues - humanist on the one hand

(see for example, Rychlak, 1988), and phenomenological on the other (see for
example, Polkinghorne, 1988) - seems a highly valuable undertaking. Similarly, a
vital expansion of resources is represented in the attempt by psychologists to revive
the hermeneutical tradition (cf.Messer, Sass, and Woolfolk, 1988; Addison and
Packer, 1989), once essential to the very concept of psychology as a
Geisteswissenschaft. Hermeneutical deliberations serve the valuable function of
thwarting the modes of depersonalization so common to the empirical research
tradition.
I find much to be credited, as well, in work that draws from our traditions in such a
way as to expand the range of "valuing discourse." The psychological profession has
been so captivated by the instrumentalist ethos and its emphasis on problem solving,
that its primary offering to the culture has been a discourse of deficit (Gergen, 1994,
Chpt. 6). The massive and ever-expanding terminologies of mental illness, for
example, all function as means of placing social identity at risk. As the discourse is
placed into action, it discredits, divides and distances. Vitally needed, then, are
discourses inviting people into more valued modes of being, ways of constructing
self and others that add to the sense of well-being and human welfare. Among the
important contributions of this kind I would place early attempts to reconstruct
women's psychology in a more empowering register (Gilligan, 1982; Belenky, et al.
1986), Lifton's (1993) conception of the protean self as a source of resilience,
Csikszentmihalyi's (1990) construction of the "flow" experience, and the emerging
interest in wisdom (Sternberg, 1990). In spite of their realist predelictions, in each
case the theorists draw from traditions outside the mechanistic - and sustain and
enrich languages that invest persons with special gifts, potentials and powers.
Other work disposed toward the positive register is more directly informed by
constructionist metatheory. Here scholars are less likely to delineate a specific mode
of psychological being, as they are to argue for expanding possibilities of
constructing self and others. For example, Averill and Nunley (1992), in a volume
intended for a non-academic readership, argue for the possibility of leading an
"emotionally creative" life, one that takes into account the socially grounded
character of emotional expression. In their volume, Constructing the Life Course
Gubrium, Holstein and Buckholdt (1994) abandon the traditional view of epigenetic
trajectories of development, and explore the possibilities for collaborative
construction of individual futures. This same orientation toward the creative use of
construction now pervades a large domain of therapeutic theory and practice (see for
example, White and Epston, 1990; Weingarten, 1991; McNamee and Gergen, 1993;
Anderson, 1996).
These are but a sampling of illustrations of the way in which scholars can draw from
existing cultural dialogues to crystallize ontologies of the person, intelligibilities that
are more fully "actionable" than the formalisms of the academy, and which explicitly
carry with them implications for cultural transformation. The potentials for such
poetic activism have scarcely been explored. Spiritual traditions, for example, are
enormously important within the culture, but have been generally eliminated from the

psychologist's vocabulary. Further, the range of actionable vocabulary and narrative
should be enriched by alterior traditions, from textual histories beyond the West.
Slowly we begin to realize the potentials of Indian writings on the mind (see for
example, Paranjpe, 1984), Confucianist conceptions of self (Tu Wei-ming, 1985),
and Mestizo concepts of the person and mental health (Ramirez, 1983). This process
of cross-fertilization is but in a fledgling state, and much to be welcomed from a
constructionist perspective.
As we see, the second orientation to psychological inquiry favored by
constructionism stresses the resuscitation and refurbishment of psychological
intelligibilities for purposes of augmenting the discursive resources of the culture.
The attempt, then, is to enrich psychology in ways that may favor positive
transformations of society. Yet, in the same way that we found limits to
constructionist critique, a reflexive moment is also required in the present case. Three
issues demand particular attention. At the outset, the present proposal may smack of
the disingenuous. If constructionism abolishes all foundations or ultimate warrants
for propositions about persons, the critic may advance, then wouldn't subsequent
attempts to "describe and explain" - as in the above - stand empty ("mere words"), or
worse, operate as forms of propaganda? Why should the psychologist engage in such
efforts? And, what difference would there be between the psychologist's
pronouncements on "flow," "protean potentials," "wisdom" and the like and the
priest's accounts of god or the spiritual life? In reply, there would be little reason for
the constructionist scholar to plump for these intelligibilities on any foundational
grounds. The accounts of the person would not be favored because they "are true,"
but rather, because as intelligible interpretations they offer significant options for
action. The theorist need not suffer the loss of confidence, nor the self-loathing
accompanying duplicity, any more in speaking of "psychological process" than in
calling a "foul ball" at a baseball game, or declaring child molesting evil within
his/her community. Confidence and the sense of authenticity are born of communal
participation as opposed to grounding in "the true," or "the real." In this sense
psychological theory is no more or less true than spiritualism or physics. Cultural
intelligibilities sprout in many soils. However, the tradition of mental accounting is a
rich and significant one, in many ways pivotal for the major institutions of the West.
The importance of considered, creative and communal attention to its further
elaboration can scarcely be overestimated.
The second problem concerns the problematic traces of pragmatism implied by the
present arguments, and most pointedly the instrumentalist interpretation of
pragmatism. As I have argued, constructionism invites the scholar to consider the
societal utility of psychological theory, and bring into being conceptions favoring
certain social ends as opposed to others. This would seem to thrust the theorist into
the role of grand strategist, attempting to provide tools to the society for constructing
itself in the image favored by the theorist. The theorist functions instrumentally to
create desirable effects in the social world. Yet, while allying itself with the
pragmatist tradition, the instrumentalist conception of the pragmatic is not a
congenial companion to constructionism. The instrumentalist view is largely an

outgrowth of individualism, and most particularly, the assumption that individuals
are rational and autonomous decision makers operating to achieve their personal
goals. However, constructionism not only fails to objectify the person as a rational
agent, but when its conceptual implications are extended it favors a view of human
action quite at odds with the traditional view. Although we shall treat this view
shortly, the important point in this context is to appreciate the difference between a
constructionist and an instrumentalist concept of the pragmatic. Constructionism's
particular emphasis is on meaningful action embedded not within individual minds
but within more extended patterns of interchange. Thus, meaningful action is always
consequential in the sense of bearing an interdependent relationship between what
preceded and what follows. By virtue of convention, one's actions thus sustain and/or
suppress that which has been, and simultaneously function to create a present with
future ramifications. Precisely what these "ramifications" are is open to continuous
negotiation, which negotiation itself functions pragmatically in this more relational
sense (see also Botschner, 1995).
Finally, the critic might locate within these proposals a "transformationist bias," that
is, a continuous championing of the new, the expanded and the revolutionary as
opposed to the accepted, the traditional, and secure. Surely this is the dominant
subtext of the above. However, this bias must be seen against the backdrop of the
current context, both intellectual and cultural. To the extent that western psychology
is largely a child of cultural modernism (Gergen, 1991), and cultural modernism has
achieved broad ascendance - its premises now grounding most of the culture's major
institutions - then a psychology that simply contributes to the status quo has little to
offer the culture. It functions as an elfin voice in a mighty chorus. Constructionism
itself is not antithetical to tradition; indeed, tradition is essential to the construction of
all meaning. However, to the extent that one wishes to participate in a profession that
plays a significant role in augmenting or expanding or augmenting the culture's
resources, constructionist arguments can lend strong support. In effect, there seems
less to be gained in the present era through duplication of longstanding
intelligibilities as opposed to catalytic conceptualization.
The Social Reconstruction of the Mind
There is a third orientation to psychological theorizing advanced by constructionist
writings, an orientation to which the preceding arguments serve as important
antecedents. As we have seen, significant criticism has been directed toward
traditional psychology for its implicit support of individualist ideology and
institutions. As it is variously reasoned, tracing human action to psychological
sources sustains a view of persons as fundamentally isolated, self-gratifying, and selfsufficient. From the traditional standpoint, relationships are artificial byproducts of
otherwise autonomously functioning individuals; the social is secondary to and
derivative of the personal. As such conceptions are played out in cultural life, critics
argue, they naturalize alienation, self-absorption, and a conflict of all against all.
Coupled with this critique, however, is the second logic developed above, namely
that a major aim of scholarship from the constructionist standpoint should be the

enrichment of cultural resources. In particular, through the development of new
ontologies, alternative and possibly more promising avenues of action within the
culture may be opened. As these lines of argument are compounded, they conduce to
investments in reconceptualizing the individual in other than individualistic terms.
There are many forms which such reconceptualization might take - ecological, social
structural, and social evolutionary among them. However, specifically invited by
social constructionist metatheory, is the social reconstitution of the individual. That
is, within the many dialogues making up the constructionist movement, the social is
given primacy over the individual. Significant attention is given, for example, to
language, dialogue, negotiation, social pragmatics, conversational positioning, ritual,
cultural practice, and the distribution of power. As earlier advanced, constructionist
theorists are scarcely obliged to reinstantiate a constructionist metatheory in their
scientific/scholarly accounts of the world or persons. In this respect the metatheory
dictates nothing. However, because constructionist metatheory implies an alternative
to the individualized conception of human action, there is good reason for exploring
its potentials in developing more social or relational accounts of the person. In effect,
the third constructionist orientation to the psychological world is to reconstitute it as
a domain of the social.
Of course, attempts to conceptualize the individual as a social actor have long been
fixtures on the intellectual landscape (see Burkitt's 1991 review). Current
constructionist attempts must be viewed as extensions of this tradition. At the same
time, there are important differences among current theorists, differences with respect
to their affinity to central constructionist tenets. For analytic purposes it is useful to
consider a continuum of conceptualizations, varying in terms of their congeniality
with traditional individualism and its close alliance with empiricist metaphysics as
opposed to the primacy of relationship implicit within constructionist writings. Let us
first consider the more conservative pole. Characterized by a deep respect for existing
traditions, we find conceptualizations of the social self which 1) place a strong
emphasis on specifically psychological states or processes, 2) presume the reality of
their subject matter (beyond cultural premises), 3) rely on or attempt to establish
foundations for further exploration and understanding, 4) treat the language of
analysis as correspondent with nature, and the concomitatant role of the
scientist/scholar as informant to the culture, and 5) treat the scientific/scholarly effort
as politically/ideologically neutral. For purposes of comparison and evaluation, let us
first consider social reconceptualizations retaining such traditional tendencies.
Individuals as Cultural Carriers
The nativist-environmentalist binary, around which most of the major debates in
psychology have revolved over the century, furnishes the germinating context for the
one of the most important attempts at socially reconstituting the self. That persons are
influenced by their cultural surrounds has virtually served as a theoretical truism for
psychology. This was most obviously the case during the hegemony of behaviorism,
but even the nativistically oriented cognitivists have been unable - lest they sink on

the shoals of solipsism - to abandon this conceptual mooring. Yet, the manner in
which social reconstructions of the individual have extended this tradition form a
dramatic disjunction with both behaviorist and cognitivist formulations. In both these
cases the strong presumption prevails that the individual is endowed with certain
psychological structures or processes. For the behaviorist the environment may
stimulate or inform the internal conditions; for cognitivists the external conditions
provide raw resources for cognitive appropriation. In neither case is the mental
fundament itself produced, extinguished or transformed. It is precisely this move that
characterizes a range of recent attempts at social reconstitution. As it is variously
reasoned, it is not the self-contained individual who precedes culture, but the culture
that establishes the basic character of psychological functioning.
Not only does this family of attempts benefit from the environmentalist tradition, but
in most cases significant linkages are forged with theories from psychology's past.
For example, Bruner's highly influential work (1990) draws sustenance from
Vygotsky, Bartlett, Mead, and a host of other significant psychological figures in
proposing that "it is culture, not biology, that shapes human life and the human mind,
that gives meaning to action by situating its underlying intentional states in an
interpretive system." (p. 34) In contrast, James Gee (1992) squeezes support from
myriad linguistic and cognitive contributions to argue that "the individual interprets
experience by forming 'folk theories,' which together with nonlinguistic modules of
the mind, cause the person to talk and act in certain ways..." (p. 104) Related attempts
to "socialize" the self have drawn significantly from George Kelly (Neimeyer and
Neimeyer, 1985), Freud (Freeman, 1993), and object relations theory (Mitchell,
1993).
For illustrative purposes, let us consider Harre and Gillett's (1994) comprehensive
account of the individual as cultural carrier. Although specifically disavowing
dualism, the hypothetico-deductive program, and laboratory experimentation, the
volume rapidly moves on to discuss the nature of psychological states and conditions.
"Concepts," we learn, are "the basis of thinking, and are expressed by words." (p.21)
Further, "we must learn to see the mind as the meeting point of a wide range of
structuring influences..." (p. 22) The authors then proceed to describe processes of
thought, "cognitive systems that can cope with the complexity and variety of realworld experiences..." (p. 79), the individual as an agent of his/her actions, experience,
and perception The reality of these various processes is never in question, nor is their
function in dealing with "the world as it really is...not just as one might wish it to be."
(p. 49) Further, a full chapter ("Discourse and the Brain") is devoted to linking these
mental processes to neural networks. Discussion of brain function serves the
additional function of lodging the analysis in "established knowledge," that is, giving
it foundations. It is the avowed effort of the volume to establish the basis for a
"second cognitive revolution." That the analysis is attempting to illuminate the truth
of human functioning is a supposition never subjected to reflective scrutiny.
Throughout, the authors position their own discourse as truth carrying, with the
reader interpellated as unenlightened audience. Nor is the volume viewed as
ideologically invested. Its primary aim is to inform the reader of the nature of human

action, to "make the main tenets and some of the research results of discursive
psychology easily available." (p. viii).
These varying attempts to conceptualize individual process as derivative of social
process represent an important step toward refiguring psychology's conception of the
person. And, while many constructionists find this explanatory orientation still too
conservative, its very resonance with the preceding tradition may serve as its most
important rhetorical asset. The views are innovative, but not radically disruptive; they
invite existing intelligibilities and skills into dialogue rather than undermining them;
they are collaborative rather than condemning. Is there reason, then, for seeking
alternatives to the metaphor of individual as cultural carrier? Many would argue
affirmatively. By their very familiarity, such orientations run the risk of full
absorption into the existing traditions. They too easily become candidates for
empirical evaluation, with such assessment implicitly reinforcing a dualist
metaphysics that must, in the end, eschew these very conceptions. For the
metaphysics of empirical assessment presumes the existence of a scientist who can
claim truth beyond culture, comprehension beyond "folk psychology," universality
rather than historicity. If these theories of mind as cultural carrier are candidates for
truth, then they must in the end, necessarily be falsified.
This is not the only reason for pressing the boundaries of intelligibility past the view
of persons as cultural carriers. On the conceptual level, these views leave difficult
problems unanswered. The paramount question, as to how cultural understandings
can be acquired by the individual, remains theoretically intractable. As I have argued
elsewhere (Gergen, 1994, Chpt.5), the problem is insoluble in principle. If mental
process reflects social process, then the acquisition of the social must proceed
without benefit of mental processing. If mental process is required in order to
understand the social, then the mental must precede the social. The social view of the
individual collapses. Further, many constructionists find such accounts insufficiently
reflexive, not only by virtue of the hierarchies created in their claims to authority, but
in their insensitivity to the ethical and political implications of their work. Alternative
revisionings of the person are thus invited.
Individuals as Culturally Immersed
A second and smaller family of social reconstitutionalists is less obviously linked to
the traditional assumptions of the field. Focal attention shifts in this case from
expositions of psychological process itself to characterizing self within ongoing
relationships, from internal residues of cultural experience to ongoing social process
from which individual functioning cannot be extricated. In such accounts, the selfother (individual/culture) binary is virtually destroyed. For theorists of this stripe,
traditional psychology offers few conceptual resources (selected offerings of Harry
Stack Sullivan and of Vygotsky notwithstanding); other traditions must be located.
For example, Edward Sampson draws significantly from both Wittgenstein (1953)
and Bakhtin (1981, 1986) in arguing that "all meaning, including the meaning of
one's self, is rooted in the social process and must be seen as an ongoing

accomplishment of that process. Neither meaning nor self is a precondition for social
interaction; rather, these emerge from and are sustained by conversations occurring
between people." (p.99) In his development of a "rhetorically responsive" view of
human action, Shotter (1993) expands the range of relevant contributions to include
Vico, Valosinov and Garfinkel. Shotter is concerned with the way "responsive
meanings are always first 'sensed' or 'felt' from within a conversation, ...and amenable
to yet further responsive (sensible) development"." (p.180).
In this context, Hermans and Kempen's (1993) volume, The dialogical self, meaning
as movement, provides an instructive contrast to the Harre and Gillett analysis. The
extensive accounts of mental process in the latter work can be compared with the
sotto voce analysis of mind in Hermans and Kempen. For example, for these authors,
emotions are "rhetorical actions," and agency is a byproduct of participation in a
dialogic relationship. This more sparing account of mental process is a congenial
companion to muted realism. The authors are also sensitized to the function of
metaphor in guiding their theoretical account (pgs. 8-10), acknowledging that their
discussion of mental process is based on the metaphor of the narrative (Chpt. 2).
Eschewing the attempt to furnish foundations, they propose that "The main purpose
of this work is to bring together two familiar concepts, dialogue and self, and
combine them in such a way that a more extended view of the possibilities of the
mind becomes visible."(p.xx) And, while occasionally weaving data into their
analysis, their use of evidence is not intended to finalize the discussion. Rather, "we
want to present some empirical explorations that serve as illustration of our more
extensive theoretical and conceptual discussions." (p.xx)
Hermans and Kempen do little to articulate the social/political consequences of their
account; they are far more invested in the contribution their work makes to the
academic community than to the more general ethos of politics. More telling here are
Sampson's (1993) and Shotter's (1993a) societal sensitivity. Sampson's analysis is
specifically dedicated to a "celebration of the other," and the potential of such a
formulation for undermining power and reducing suppression. Shotter (1993a) is
deeply concerned with the political dimension of everyday interaction, and with
using psychology to give marginal voices a broader space of expression.
The Relational Constitution of Self
Although a dramatic contrast to traditional psychological theorizing, and
substantially more congenial with constructionist metatheory, there is yet a third
orientation more radical than cultural immersion formulations. As indicated,
constructionist metatheory traces ontological posits to language, and language to
processes of relationship. By implication, all that may be said about mental process is
derived from relational process. If this view is pressed to its extreme, one is invited
explore a terrain of theoretical intelligibility in which mental predicates never
function referentially, and social process serves as the essential fulcrum of
explanation. That is, we may envision the elimination of psychological states and
conditions as explanations for action, and the reconstitution of psychological

predicates within the sphere of social process. Such a possibility is made particularly
salient by the kinds of historical and cultural inquiries into conceptions of the mental
discussed above. If one accepts the historical and cultural relativity of psychological
discourse suggested by these writings, then one resists resting a contemporary
formulation on particular presumptions about psychological functioning. More
bluntly, one might resist reconstituting the individual as a social being in the fashion
of the preceding accounts, as they attempt to ground themselves in universal or
transcultural ontologies of the mind.
An opening to a de-psychologized account of human action is forged within
contemporary discourse analysis. In many of these writings, the analyst does not
presume the ontology implied by discursive conventions, including the ontology of
mind. In Potter and Wetherell's (1987) ground breaking work, for example, the
concept of "attitude" is shorn of mental referents, and is used to index positional
claims within social intercourse. Billig's (1990) essay on memory focuses on the way
in which people negotiate the past as a replacement for the traditional emphasis on
inner processes of memory. Or as Shotter (1990) proposes, memory is a "social
institution."3 Edwards and Potter's Discursive Psychology represents a significant
attempt to replace cognitive with discursive processes in explaining human
interchange. Stenner and Eccleston's (1994) account of the "textualization of being"
also resonates with this line of argument.
Perhaps the most fully explicit attempt to wed this form of theorizing to a
constructionist metatheory has been my own (especially Gergen, 1994). While owing
an enormous debt to the preceding works, the attempt in this case has been to place
the primary emphasis on relational pattern more generally. Thus, while focally
concerned with discourse, the attempt is to theorize more fully enriched patterns of
relational performance (including bodily activities of the participants, along with
various objects, ornaments, and physical settings necessary to render these
performances intelligible). In this sense, discourse is often central to the analysis, but
spoken or written language does not exhaust the spectrum of concerns. Further, on
this account, psychological terms are not exclusively used in processes of personal
attribution (i.e. constative), but are often critical elements of performance itself
(performative).
To clarify, consider the case of emotion. Emotion terms (e.g. anger, love, depression)
may serve as key elements of conversation, and the attribution of emotions to self and
others of primary significance in social interchange. I have found it more useful,
however, to consider emotional performances more holistically (Gergen, 1994,
pgs.210-235). This means viewing linguistic expressions as possible but not essential
components of actions that may require patterns of gesture, gaze, bodily orientation
(and possibly physical artifacts or a locale) to achieve their intelligibility. Here my
initial debt is largely to Averill's (1982) work on emotional performances. However,
the attempt is to press beyond the individual performance to consider the patterns of
interchange within which the performance is embedded, and without which it would
constitute cultural nonsense. The term "relational scenario" thus indexes reiterative

patterns of interchange (lived narratives) in which "psychological performances" play
an integral role. Thus, for example, the performance of anger (complete with
discourse, facial expressions, postural configurations) is typically embedded within a
scenario in which a preceding affront may be required for its expression to acquire
meaning; the performance of anger also sets the stage for the subsequent occurrence
of an apology or a defense; and if an apology is offered; a favored response to an
apology within the western scenario is forgiveness. At that juncture the scenario may
be terminated. All the actions making up the sequence, from affront to forgiveness,
require each other to achieve legitimacy. This form of analysis also applies to other
forms of psychological performance (see for example, Gergen, 1994a, for a relational
account of memory).
Unlike much discourse analysis (and the bulk of conversation analysis) this account
does not place a strong emphasis on evidential grounds. The goal of truth is
eschewed, and objectivity as the research desideratum is replaced with intelligibility.
This does not eliminate my positioning of the reader as "unknowing," but it does
render my account vulnerable as "knowing." In effect, the intelligibility of the
account cannot be achieved without the assent of the reader. Further, most discursive
analysis is terminated in the act of representation; similar to traditional research, the
action implications (if any) are left for the reader to determine. Consistent with
constructionist metatheory, and its emphasis on the use-value of language, my own
attempt has been increasingly to press past the printed page to locate or develop
relevant cultural practices. For exmple, if certain emotional scenarios are inimical to
the participants' well-being, how can they intelligibly alter the familiar course of
action? The attempt, then, is to extend the use-value of the theoretical discourse to
patterns of daily life (see,for example, McNamee and Gergen, in press). And while
much (but not all) discursive work is politically neutral, the present account is
explicitly set against individualist ideology and related practices.
While these attempts to reconstitute the self as relational are more radical than the
preceding alternatives, in the end we must also recognize their limitations. On the one
hand, many scholars find them sufficiently dislocating that grafting them to more
recognized (and professionally acceptable) pursuits is prohibited. On the other
extreme, the more sociologically inclined argue that such accounts are far too microsocial. One may indeed reinscribe "the mind" as a collective phenomenon, arguing
that reason, memory and the like are broadly distributed within organizations or
cultures (see for example, Douglas, 1986). Still others will find these orientations far
too elitist. The analyses are intelligible only to an academically privileged. Finally,
the strong emphasis on relationships is viewed as inimical to the important values
inherent in the individualist tradition (e.g. democracy, humanism, equality).
Insufficient attention has been given to the positive character of the tradition that is
otherwise placed in jeopardy.
In Conclusion
As we find, far from eliminating psychological inquiry, social constructionism

functions generatively to expand and enrich its potentials. At the outset, the
constructionist impetus toward denaturalization and reflection not only invites the
scholar to see how his/her work contributes to the moral and political fabric of the
culture, but to open the field to a broader range of intelligibility. Favored in
particular, are forms of dialogue that linking the discipline with its cultural surrounds,
mutually transforming intelligibilities in such a way that the discipline plays a more
vital role in the society. Constructionist ideas also invite the scholar to consider the
potentials in resuscitating and enriching the compendium of mental discourse. Given
a keen concern with the moral and political context, the scholar engages in a forms of
theoretical poetics that open the culture to new, forgotten or otherwise suppressed
intelligibilities, and thus, new alternatives for action. Finally, we have seen how
constructionist dialogues can stimulate the development of social alternatives to the
traditional conception of the self-contained individual. In significant respects, these
revisionings of the person are intended as resources for societal change. There is no
necessary antagonism between constructionism and psychological inquiry. Rather,
informed by constructionist metatheory, there is reason to believe that psychology
can play a far more vital role within society than heretofore.
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